ABSTRACT With the advancement of cloud computing, the control flow integrity (CFI) of virtual machines' kernel becomes more and more important for the security of cloud services. Many CFI checking and protecting approaches have been proposed. Among them, dynamic analysis approaches have the best detection capability, but they are rarely used because of the high overhead introduced to the virtual machines to be monitored. In this paper, we propose a function-level kernel CFI checking approach to meet the performance requirements in the cloud. By combining the static memory analysis and the dynamic tracing, our system can achieve high detection capability with low overhead. Since the analysis and tracing targets of our system are kernel functions, our system incurs lower overhead to the monitored virtual machines than the instruction-level monitors. We propose two models to describe the kernel control flows. After building the secure control flow database by learning the normal behaviors, we can detect abnormal control flows in real time. With the help of virtualization and virtual machine introspection techniques, we implement a prototype system in the hardware virtualization environment. From the evaluation, our system has high detection capability with reasonable overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
The infrastructure as a service built on modern virtualization technologies become increasing popular in cloud computing, but at the same time virtual machines (VMs) in cloud are facing serious security challenges. If they are compromised, cloud services or user applications running in those VMs will no longer be trusted. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure VM security for cloud computing.
The control flow integrity (CFI) in kernel is one of the key approaches to ensure VM security. The current methods and tools for checking CFI can be classified as memory analyzing and dynamical tracing scheme. Memory analyzing methods read and analyze execution memory to detect abnormal control flows. These methods do not introduce high overhead to the target system, but memory could be modified or allocated during the target system execution. They also could miss the execution information, which causes the degradation of their detection capability. Dynamical tracing methods trace the target system execution and analyze the extracted execution information to check CFI. These methods can capture rich execution information to achieve higher detection capability. However, most of these methods trace at instruction level or branch level, which incur huge penalty on the target system. Heavy overhead makes these approaches less practical in cloud because it can lead to significant performance degradation. Some approaches analyze the statistics of the execution information to check CFI, but these approaches have high false positives and false negatives.
To check kernel CFI in cloud, virtual machine introspection (VMI) technique is an optimal choice for monitor tools. In VMI architecture, monitoring tools and sensors are running in virtual machine monitor (VMM) or secure virtual machine (SVM). Since VMM has the highest privilege, VMI-based monitors are safe and transparent to the target virtual machine. Multiple VMI-based security tools have been proposed. By using VMI technique, Cloud Service Providers (CSP) can collect execution information from a virtual machine.
In order to check the kernel control integrity of virtual machines and meet the requirements for cloud environment such as low overhead and high detection capability features, we propose a VMI-based function-level analysis approach to check VM kernel CFI. Our approach traces and analyzes kernel function-level memory and execution information out of the virtual machine to check kernel CFI. Since our monitor targets at kernel functions instead of instructions, the monitored virtual machine is intercepted only when a new kernel function is executed. Therefore, the overhead of our function-level monitor is much less than the instruction-level ones. By combining memory analysis and dynamic tracing, our monitor achieves high detection capability with lower overhead.
We propose two models to describe function-level kernel execution control flows. We leverage the function-level kernel execution information to build the database of secure kernel control flows at the learning stage. During the monitoring stage, we analyze the extracted execution information based on the database to detect kernel level attacks. We also propose three optimization strategies to further reduce the overhead. Since our monitor is VMI-based, it is difficult to be compromised by attackers.
The main contributions of our work are listed as follows:
1) We propose a VMI-based function-level dynamical tracing approach to check VM kernel CFI. Our solution can be used by CSP to dynamically monitor virtual machines in an ''out-of-the-box'' way. 2) We implemented the prototype in a hardware-assisted virtualized environment by using hardware-based events to further reduce the monitoring overhead.
3) The effectiveness and performance of our system has been evaluated which shows that our monitor has high detection capability and low overhead.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II summarizes the related work. Section III describes threat model and system overview. Section IV presents how the control flow data are collected. Section V details two detection approaches on control flow abnormality. Several optimizations on our solution are discussed in Section VI. Section VII evaluates the effectiveness and performance of our solution. Conclusions and our future work are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing works on the CFI can be classified in two categories: memory analyzing and dynamical tracing schemes.
Memory analyzing approach enables security checking on CFI by investigating on-the-spot memory snapshot or kernel source codes to detect attacks. The work [1] verifies the CFI through the right properties of kernel mode stack. Total-CFI [2] first identifies key guest kernel semantics such as processes and code modules which then guarantees the CFI via shadow call stack. Inspired by virtual machine introspection [3] , OSck [4] designs a VMI-based tool, which ensures safety properties of VM kernel heap data structures. The study [5] proposes an allocation-driven mapping scheme that can systematically locate dynamic kernel objects. SBCFI [6] traces kernel memory and in-use function pointers to detect control flow manipulation. However, due to the lack of the execution information, memory analyzing approaches may not effectively detect abnormal control flows.
In comparison, dynamic tracing approaches track system execution and analyze the context to check the CFI. PEMU [7] is a QEMU-based dynamic binary tool, which injects tracing instructions at runtime prior to the execution of target instructions. HCODE [8] is a real-time CFI enhancer that reads each instruction to confirm whether the control flow graph is respected. Indexed hooks [9] protects the CFI by thoroughly transforming and restricting kernel control data to legal jump targets. In order to reduce the overhead, some methods optimize the analysis using statistical information. The work [10] makes use of hardware performance counters (HPCs) to detect malicious program when the system is loading and running. NumChecker [11] also leverages HPCs to monitor certain hardware events during system calls' execution. DCFI-checker [12] counts the number of branch instructions using performance monitoring counter to inspect dynamic control flows. Although, dynamic tracing approaches always introduce high overhead to the monitored systems.
For security of cloud computing, researchers have proposed many secure tools that offer security service. Cloud-VMI [13] virtualizes the VMI interface as a cloud service that is offered to cloud customers. CLAW [14] is a cloudbased application whitelisting system, which leverages VMI technique to guarantee that only pre-approved application binaries are allowed to run in virtual machines. Key management [21] - [23] is essential for security. Several papers (e.g., [24] - [26] ) have studied related security issues.
III. THREAT MODEL AND SYSTEM OVERVIEW A. THREAT MODEL
To investigate factors that may potentially undermine the integrity of OS kernel, we collected a variety of kernel rootkits, and then conducted in-depth analysis at the source code level. It is concluded that most rootkits tamper with the specific addresses of the kernel and then change the normal routine of system calls. Through hijacking control flows, rootkits can conceal themselves from detection by administrators, eavesdrop users or even manipulate the kernel arbitrarily. In other words, it is a must for the ''successful'' rootkits.
Basically, there are three approaches to hijack control flows:
1) Modify the addresses stored in system call table, such as sys_getdents, sys_kill, sys_fork, etc. In this case, control flows will be redirected to unexpected routines, which enables attackers to control system behaviors intentionally. For instance, to hide its footprint, a rootkit can replace the pointer to normal sys_getdents with a pointer to its own hacked_getdents in system call table as shown in Figure 1 . When trying to list all running processes, the kernel first locates the address of sys_getdents and then executes it as shown in solid line in Figure 1 . By contrast, the actual routine compromised by a rootkit is executed in dotted line where the hacked_getdents will be called instead of the original one, which implies the rootkit is able to filter the processes by removing itself from the list. That is, users or even administrators are difficult to obtain a complete process list from a manipulated control flow. 2) Modify the subroutines of system calls, such as proc_lookup, proc_readdir, etc al. Similarly, when the kernel executes system calls, control flows will be transferred to the malicious subroutine once it is called. Since the modification can happen anywhere in the system call routine, these attacks are more difficult to detect. 3) Modify the kernel objects to redirect the kernel control flow. For example, some direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) attacks can tamper with the file operation pointers of some files to change the control flow of the filesystem. In summary, the integrity of system kernel is compromised via hijacking system calls in the execution path, and accordingly control flows will be manipulated by malicious rootkits. For the threat model in this paper, we consider the attacks that cause the anomalies of control flows. Besides, in this paper we aim to protect the VMs from control flow hijacking by leveraging VMI technique. Therefore, we assume that the software components (VMM and Dom0) that are more privileged than VMs are trusted, which can be enforced by using security tools, such as [15] . The possibilities of exploiting these components will not be considered in our threat model. We focus on the attacks limited in the VMs.
B. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The concept of VMI is first introduced in work [3] , which enables the IDS to inspect what is happening in a virtual machine from the outside. Typically, there are two components in a virtualized environment, such as VMM and VM. A VMM acts as a host and has full control of the processor(s) as well as other underlying hardwares, which presents the upper layer with an abstraction of virtual resources. In contrast, a VM is a guest environment that supports a software stack consisting of operating system and applications. Each VM operates independently and uses the same interface to processor(s), memory, storage, and I/O provided by a physical platform, that acts as if it was running on a platform without the VMM. VMI provides a novel way to observe and respond to VM events from an isolated and privileged location. Within the VMI-enabled architecture, monitoring functions can be migrated from VM to VMM. Since VMM is more privileged and also transparent to VM, VM-level malware is difficult to attack or even detect VMM-level agents. Based on the VMI techniques, our method is to monitor and analyze the control flow at function level. Compared with the instruction level, it can greatly reduce the frequency of monitoring events and hence the overhead. Also, the semantic of control flows can be restored in terms of function other than instructions, to ensure the detection accuracy of control flow anomalies. Using the trace of system call functions, we model the normal behaviors through two methods in a controlled environment. In addition, we can calculate the real-world deviations from the normal behaviors to validate the integrity of the control flow. Finally,, we make several optimizations to achieve a better performance in cloud environment.
The overall system architecture is illustrated in Figure 2 , where we implement the detection system in a highly privileged VM that interacts with the target VM via the VMM. The detection system consists of three modules: data collection, learning and detection as a pipeline. The data collection module is responsible for gathering the relevant data generated by control flows in the target VM during the kernel execution. After data pre-processing, it transfers the execution information and the extracted control flow to other modules. In the learning stage, the learning module leverages the processed data from the data collection module to build the secure control flow set. This stage happens during the period where we assume that the VM is secure. For example, the VM runs in a secure environment before being deployed in an open-access environment. During the detection phase, the detection module is responsible for checking the kernel CFI by analyzing the real-time extracted control flow, based on the secure control flow set learned by the learning module.
IV. CONTROL FLOW DATA COLLECTION
The data collection module is the basis of the detection method, which makes use of the VMI technique to finish two tasks: one is to inject checkpoints into the monitored virtual machine to trace the function-level control flow from the VMM, and the other is to extract the VM kernel memory for further analyzing. We focus on the target VM system call control flows, because most of the critical kernel operations are performed by system calls, which are usually tampered by kernel rootkits. To monitor the execution of system calls, we first need to distinguish one control flow from each other and then trace its execution at the function level. We choose to study the function-level control flow, because the control flow is formed by the function calls. Thus, tracing the control flow at function level is more accurate with lower overhead. In the view of functions, kernel control flow can be represented naturally as an abstraction of execution routine from one function to another.
A. CONTROL FLOW SEPARATION
There are many running control flows generated from different processes simultaneously, which demonstrates intertwined and complex relationships among functions. For operating system kernels, using the system calls are the best way to differentiate the control flows. Therefore, the first step is to find the starting and ending point to obtain a complete control flow of a system call. Each system call has its own starting and ending points, which can be served as the basis to separate control flows from each other. All system calls during this period are grouped as an independent control flow.
Starting with Windows XP and Linux 2.6, an alternative system call entry mechanism named ''fast system call'' is introduced where companion instructions SYSEN-TER/SYSEXIT [16] are invoked to enter/exit the system call. Fast system call clearly specifies the addresses where a system call enters and returns from, this enables us to monitor them and check each control flow.
B. INSTRUCTION ANALYSIS
The basic unit in our solution is function, so we need to find the addresses and code blocks of all the functions involved during the execution of the control flow from VM memory. In order to identify the functions, we first analyze the instructions to find out the positions of all functions in the control flow, which involves a static analysis and dynamic tracing process. In the static analysis process, we analyze the instructions from the entrance of each function to find the next function in the control flow. We also need to obtain the code block between the start and end of a function for further analysis.
As we know, the instructions can be divided into two categories: non-branching instructions and branch instructions. The non-branching instructions are executed in the ascending order of the program counter, and the branch instruction can cause the program counter to be changed to jump to a new address and continue execution. Therefore, we need to focus on the analysis of branch instructions, given in Table 1 . In these branch instructions, CALL instruction are always used to jump to the next function, and RET instruction is used to return from a function. The function address can be obtained when we find the Call instruction. We can find all of the CALL and RET instructions of a system call to follow up the control flow. Therefore, the out-of-VM analysis simulates the CPU to follow up the execution routine and search the CALL and RET instruction. With the help of VMI, it recognizes the address and content of the instruction to further inspect the target address that the program jumps to based on the semantics of the instruction. This procedure continues until it finishes parsing the whole content of the function. However, this method can only analyze the direct branch instructions. There are two kinds of branch instructions: direct branch instructions and indirect branch instructions [17] . An indirect branch is also known as a computed jump, indirect jump and register-indirect jump, so we cannot get the target address through static analysis. In order to build a complete control flow, we leverage dynamic tracing to follow up the indirect branches.
C. INSTRUCTION INJECTIONS
Since the indirect branch instructions are transparent to the VMM, they do not involve VMM operations. To trace these instructions from VMM, we lift the execution of these instructions to the VMM layer by employing the Intel Virtualization Technology (Intel VT) [18] such that the VMM can be aware of their states.
VOLUME 6, 2018
Intel VT offers a set of hardware extensions that make virtualization practical and efficient on the x86 platform. To facilitate virtualization, CPU operation can work in two different modes: VMX root operation and VMX non-root operation. In general, the VMM runs in root operation mode while its guest VMs run in non-root operation mode. When VMs execute privileged instructions, a transition called VM exit will take place from the VMX non root operation to VMX root operation. After VMM handles the events, a transition called VM entry will enable CPU to switch back to VMX non-root operation. With Intel VT, the interactions between a VMM, guest VMs, and the whole life cycle can be illustrated in Figure 3 . The procedure enters VMX operation by executing a VMXON instruction. When certain instructions and events cause VM exit events, VMM will take control and handle the cause of the VM exit, which can then return to the VM using a VM entry. Inspired by the transitions between VM and VMM, if the functions can be altered to trigger the switch from VM to VMM, the VMM will be aware of their states. One of those instructions that can cause VM exits is the interrupt instruction. Thus, in this paper we make use of interrupts to trap functions for Intel VT switches. After exploring many interrupt instructions, INT 3 instruction is a more reasonable choice, which is often used in software debugging known as the breakpoint instruction. INT 3 instruction is a privileged instruction causing VM exit events. By leveraging INT 3 instruction, we can inject breakpoints to the monitored VM kernel to cause a VM exit transition.
To generate an INT 3 when executing indirect branches in the VM, we employ VMI to inject INT 3 into the VM kernel and replace the indirect branch instructions, which enables the switch from VM to VMM as shown in Figure 4 . Once the VMM monitors a VM exit event caused by INT 3 instruction in VM, the data collection module obtains the instruction address and recovers the original branch instruction. Then, it traces the VM execution to get the next function address by leveraging CPU single step mode. After obtaining the target address of the indirect branch, we can continue the static analysis from the next function. In this way the control flow of the VM can be obtained by VMM. In addition, the operations like injection and revocation are completely transparent to VMs so that the VMs can work normally as usual.
D. CODE BLOCK OBTAINING AND PROTECTION
After obtaining all the functions of the system call, we get the memory code of each function for integrity checking. To this end, we map the memory to the secure VM by leveraging the Xen toolkit. The code of functions can be obtained by reading the mapped memory according to their virtual addresses. Checking the code blocks can ensure the integrity of all executed codes during the monitored system call.
In addition, we leverage the Intel Extended Page Table (Intel EPT) technique [18] to protect the code blocks of the functions. As a result, we need not to read them again when they are re-executed. Furthermore, we can also prevent the time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks [19] . Intel EPT provides memory virtualization for VMs and checks the permission of every page before it is used. We set the permission of the memory page storing the protected codes to non-writable. This way, nobody can tamper with the code blocks.
E. DISCUSSION
Our method can check the CFI with lower overhead than instruction-level monitoring. Although we have analyzed all the instructions, we end up listening to only the indirect branch instructions. Our method minimizes the interrupts of tracing control flow by leveraging the memory analysis. Compared with the instruction-level tracing monitors, our method introduces lower overhead to the monitored VM. Furthermore, our function-level method can maintain high detection capability. The function-level control flow is sufficient to capture the execution path of the kernel system calls. For the instructions in a function, we consider them as code blocks and check their integrity. Since a code block can represent all of the instructions, our method can ensure all the executed instructions are secure. In addition, because we find that all of the control flow rootkits hijack function pointers and insert their own malicious codes, we believe targeting functions is sufficient to detect the illegal behaviors of the control flows.
V. ABNORMALITY DETECTION ON CONTROL FLOWS
The detection phase processes the unknown control flows from the data collection module and identify the anomalies based on the legitimate behaviors provided by the detection models. To detect the control flow anomalies in the wild, we propose two approaches to model the abnormal control flows derived from the normal system activities, namely, the verified function comparison and short sequence of function calls. By applying them to the training data, we can model the normal behaviors, which can be used to detect whether the integrity of control flow is compromised or not.
A. VERIFIED FUNCTION DETECTION
The basic unit of control flow is a function, whose properties offer us the opportunity to examine the correctness of control flows in multiple dimensions. The verified function detection aims at the validation of the memory addresses and code blocks of different functions in a control flow, based on the fact that each memory address and code block in a valid control flow should be valid. In other words, as long as the whitelist of valid memory addresses and code block can be learned or maintained in a trusted environment, the control flow containing the memory addresses or code blocks absent from the white list can be determined as a compromised one. For instance, when some rootkits replace the normal functions with its own defined ones, the presence of 'alien' memory addresses and code blocks in a control flow can indicate the abnormality of the control flow.
In the learning stage, even though two flows F1 (A1 → A2 → A3) and F2 (A2 → A3 → A1) have different execution sequences, three valid memory addresses A1, A2, A3 and their code blocks C1, C2, C3 are learned equivalently from F1 and F2. After obtaining the legitimate control flows in a trusted environment, a signature database stores all the valid memory addresses and the corresponding code blocks as a whitelist. If any address or code block in a control flow does not exist in the database, the control flow will be identified as an illegal one. The addresses and corresponding code blocks in the control flow can be regarded as legitimate only if they can be found in the database. This way, the rootkits that replace the legitimate function pointers (e.g., system call table) with the compromised ones in the control flows invoking new addresses and code blocks can be detected. Some rootkits tamper with the kernel code instead of function pointers to achieve malicious behavior. These attacks can also be detected by our approach because they execute unverified code blocks.
B. SHORT SEQUENCE
We first perform the verified function detection, that is, the existence detection for the addresses and code blocks. If the detection passes, the second detection is performed, that is, the short sequence detection. The control flow is considered illegal if it does not pass.
Considering function addresses, a control flow can be described as a sequence of function addresses in essence, which is also an important characteristic of a control flow. In fact, the function addresses can be linked together to analyze the slices of control flow for detecting the anomalies. For example, F1 (A1 → A2 → A3) and F2 (A2 → A3 → A1) are the same in the verified function model, which means that the verified function approach does not consider the relationships among different functions in a control flow.
Automaton is usually used to describe the relationships between different states. However, building an automaton for the system call control flows is difficult. There are many branches in the control flow for any system calls. Because of the uncertainties caused by these branches, each control flow data collected from the system call may be different from previous running instances. This strong uncertainty in the control flow brings about a large number of states in the automaton, and even if the automaton is established, there is no guarantee that the automaton will contain all the possibilities of legal control flows. Therefore, we use the local features as a control flow characteristic.
Hofmeyr et al. [20] observed that there are local features in the execution trajectory of the system calls, so they proposed a short sequence method to detect the intrusion. This model uses the sequence of the division and the formation of a unique short sequence to model normal behaviors. In the detection, the sequence to be detected is also divided into short sequences and compared with the normal ones, and the proportion of non-matching is used to determine the exception. Considering that program execution also has local features, the local function address sequences in the control flow have better relevance in each system call. Therefore, the whole sequence of control flow can be divided into several short sequences, which are taken as the patterns of the control flow. These are recorded in the trusted feature model library as shown in Figure 5 which provide the basis for the control flow analysis.
In order to divide a control flow into several short sequences, a sliding window mechanism is applied. A sliding VOLUME 6, 2018 window is a fixed-length window to sample the data from the beginning to the end, both of whose endpoints are allowed to move forward continuously by the same steps (usually the step is 1) each time. When traversing a control flow, the function calls in the same window is considered as a short sequence. Typically, for a sequence of length N and a sliding window of length M , N − M + 1 short sequences can be generated, which can comprehensively represent the local features of the control flow. The whole process is illustrated in Figure 5 . For example, given two control flows F1 (A1 → A2 → A3 → A4) and F2 (A2 → A3 → A1 → A4), when the size of sliding window is set to 3, F1 has short sequences (A1 → A2 → A3) and (A2 → A3 → A4) but F2 generates two different short sequences (A2 → A3 → A1) and (A3 → A1 → A4) though both of them contains the same function calls. Obviously, short sequence method is stricter because it can contains more details.
In the learning phase, after ensuring the integrity of the kernel, the legitimate control flows and their short sequences are used to train the model for normal system activities. As more control flows are collected, the model becomes more comprehensive and accurate, which implies that the reliability of the signatures also increases correspondingly.
By following the same routine of the learning phase, a control flow is divided into several short sequences in the detection phase. Then, each short sequence is searched over the signature database to confirm whether it has been recorded before. Finally, as long as all short sequences belonging to a control flow exist in the database, it is concluded that the control flow is valid. Otherwise, once a short sequence does not exist in the database, the control flow is identified as an invalid one. However, considering that it is impossible to record all valid short sequences, we set a threshold for the ratio between the number of absent short sequences and the total number of short sequences. When its ratio exceeds the threshold, the control flow will be identified as invalid. The inevitable change of the function call order in control flows caused by rootkits can be detected by short sequence detection. In fact, the frequency of such change is often higher than the frequency caused by the uncertainty of normal system activities.
VI. OPTIMIZATION
In order to optimize our system for better performance, we further propose three improvements over the original version, including the change of the monitoring location, the adjustment of instruction injection timing and the use of the polling mechanism.
A. MONITORING LOCATION
In our design in Section IV-A, the starting and ending addresses of the fast system call mechanism is our default monitoring location. Besides the target system call, any other system calls in the kernel can also trigger a fast system call mechanism, which are invoked all the time and bring about a large amount of performance loss. Therefore, we alter the monitoring location to the entry address of the specific system call so that the monitoring will be triggered in a more controlled way.
B. INSTRUCTION INJECTION TIMING
We originally perform the instruction injection into the target system call when the detection system starts. Ultimately, even know the target system call was not invoked, the internal function in the call were actually executed. The reason is because different system calls intersect with each other in terms of sub-functions, due to the reuse of basic functions. Thus, we initialize the instruction injection and analysis of specific system call only when it begins to run. As a result, the detection system will not introduce overhead to the monitored VM when the system call is inactive.
C. POLLING MECHANISM
To further improve the performance, we refactor the system to operate in a polling way. In this mode, the detection system switches on and off in a predefined interval. Such improvement lies on the fact that the malicious behaviors usually last for a while, which guarantees that the polling-enabled system can still effectively detect the abnormal control flows. The use of polling mechanism can significantly improve system performance because it distributes the overhead over a longer period of time. However, polling will inevitably decrease detection accuracy, so a reasonable polling interval is the key to balance detection accuracy and system performance.
VII. EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness and performance, we implemented the prototype system on the top of the open-source hypervisor -Xen 4.4. The details of the privileged and the target VMs are listed in Table 2 . 
A. EFFECTIVENESS
To obtain the ground truth whether they are malwares or not, we examine 15 rootkits manually by diving into source codes and tracking their executions. These rootkits either replace the entry address of system call table or tamper with the system calls in the sub-function. For example, ''Diamorphine'' replaces the addresses of the kill, getdents, and getdents64 stored in the system call table with their own functions respectively. ''Adore-ng'' compromises the vfs_readdir function in the getdents system call where three normal sub-functions proc_readdir, root_readdir, and opt_readdir are substituted. Their exploitation details are listed in Table 3 . Among the rootkits, ''Enyelkm'' is quit different from others, it directly modifies the instructions at the entry address of fast system call rather than replacing system call table. It can be detected with the help of the verified code block checking. As a case of study, the system call sys_getdents64 is investigated in depth because it can retrieve real-time process information, which is often exploited by rootkits to erase themselves from process list. To model the target system call, we trace it at function level for 2000 times. The evaluation shows our approach can effectively detect all of the rootkits. The false positive rate of our system is about 1%.
B. PERFORMANCE
We first evaluate the overhead of the system call sys_getdents64, because it can be used to detect kernel rootkits. As a metric, the execution time of these system calls are recorded outside the VM. Moreover, the tests are repeated many times to calculate their average value as the final result, which can overcome random noises caused by volatile VM states.
Our implementation has already done some necessary optimizations, such as analyzing the system call static memory instructions and replacing some indirect branches before the system starts. Through the experiments, the execution time of system call sys_getdents64 is 75µs before the detection starts while the execution time becomes up to 19,146µs after the detection starts. In contrast, the instruction-level monitoring that tracks CPU operations step by step spends 911,046µs, which is much longer. The advantage of our solution lies on the function level monitoring instead of the instruction level, because function-level monitoring incurs much fewer events than the instruction-level one, which significantly reduces the overhead.
Several file-related system calls are also evaluated to further measure the overhead, such as sys_statfs64, sys_mkdir, sys_chomd, etc. The measurement methods are similar to those of testing sys_getdents64. The results are illustrated in Table 4 . Besides, we evaluate overall overhead systemically in a more realistic environment where the Xen 4.3 source codes are compiled. The compiling process invokes in a large number of file operations. We measured the average compiling time respectively in different situations, that is, the detection system is off and on with monitoring different system calls. The results are shown in Table 5 . From the results, we can find the overhead is between 7.5% and 22%. The main influence factor is the number of invoked system calls. If the monitored system call is invoked frequently, the overhead will be high. Fortunately, since the rootkit-related system calls (such as sys_getdents64) are usually not invoked in very high frequency, the overhead is acceptable. As for high frequent system calls, we can leverage the polling optimization strategy to reduce the overhead. Since most rootkits are persistent, polling strategy is usually used by many security tools [1] , [6] . We evaluated the polling optimization strategy with respect to how often the detection system samples the system call. It is obvious that polling interval has an important impact on the overall performance. Therefore, we set the polling interval to different values (from 1s to 4s) and their results are shown in Table 6 . When the polling interval is larger than 3s, it takes less than 1% of performance loss, which is acceptable in a real environment. In our test, the polling strategy makes system check fewer system calls, reducing the system overhead. It does not influence the detection accuracy and the false positive rate, because the rootkits are persistent in the kernel.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Inspired by VMI techniques, this paper presents a new approach that is able to monitor the kernel control flows inside VM from the outside to enforce kernel CFI dynamically. To achieve better efficiency, our approach performs function level control flow monitoring instead of the instruction level, which can dramatically reduce performance loss. To detect the suspicious malwares, we build two detection models to determine whether the control flows are malicious or not. To prove effectiveness, a prototype system is implemented in the Xen platform and furthermore optimized to improve the overall performance. Our experimental results show that the detection system can defeat all of the tested rootkits and the additional overhead is also low. In the future, we will continue to level up the monitoring with a higher view to reduce the performance loss. 
